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Context: The Disclosure, Apology, and Offer (DA&O) model, a response to
patient injuries caused by medical care, is an innovative approach receiving
national attention for its early success as an alternative to the existing inherently
adversarial, inefficient, and inequitable medical liability system. Examples of
DA&O programs, however, are few.
Methods: Through key informant interviews, we investigated the potential
for more widespread implementation of this model by provider organizations
and liability insurers, defining barriers to implementation and strategies for
overcoming them. Our study focused on Massachusetts, but we also explored
themes that are broadly generalizable to other states.
Findings: We found strong support for the DA&O model among key stake-
holders, who cited its benefits for both the liability system and patient safety.
The respondents did not perceive any insurmountable barriers to broad im-
plementation, and they identified strategies that could be pursued relatively
quickly. Such solutions would permit a range of organizations to implement
the model without legislative hurdles.
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Conclusions: Although more data are needed about the outcomes of DA&O
programs, the model holds considerable promise for transforming the current
approach to medical liability and patient safety.
Keywords: Medical liability, malpractice, patient safety, disclosure, apology,
compensation.
Injuries to patients caused by medical care continue tobedevil both patients and the medical community. The currentmedical liability system presents critical barriers to improving pa-
tient safety, ensuring fair and reasonable resolutions to medical injury
disputes, and controlling the cost of health care nationwide (Studdert,
Mello, and Brennan 2004). The negative consequences of the medical
liability system have been well documented (Kachalia and Mello 2011).
Litigation is inherently adversarial, threatening the therapeutic rela-
tionship between patient and provider. Only about 2 to 3 percent of
patients harmed by negligence pursue litigation, and only about half of
these receive compensation (Localio et al. 1991; Studdert et al. 2006).
Litigation is a protracted process, taking an average of five years from
the time of injury to claim resolution (Studdert et al. 2006). The process
also takes a great emotional toll on patients and doctors alike (Cantor
et al. 2005; Delbanco and Bell 2007; Waterman, Garbutt, and Hazel
2007; West et al. 2006). Furthermore, the tort system does not effec-
tively distinguish between individual and systemic errors (Reason 2000),
and blame is often unnecessarily placed on the health care provider for
multifactorial errors far out of his or her control (Hiatt et al. 1989;
Mello and Studdert 2008). Concerns about liability inhibit physicians’
efforts to improve patient safety and motivate them to practice defensive
medicine. As a result, they order medically unnecessary tests or avoid
treating high-risk patients. These problems are perpetuated as medical
students and trainees learn such practices early in their careers (Bren-
nan, Mello, and Studdert 2006; Kessler and McClellan 1996; Mello
et al. 2005; O’Leary et al. 2012; Studdert et al. 2005). The critical
flow of information needed to improve these systems is hindered by the
secrecy and fear that surround bad outcomes (Boothman et al. 2009;
Massachusetts Medical Society 2008).
Professional organizations, patient advocacy groups, and ethicists
have long agreed that patients have the right to full disclosure of
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unanticipated care outcomes (American Society for Healthcare Risk
Management of the American Hospital Association 2003; American
Hospital Association Management Advisory Committee 1992; Banja
2001; Institute of Medicine 2001; Wu et al. 1997). Yet patients likely
learn about only a third of all medical errors (Blendon, DesRoches, and
Brodie 2002; Kaiser Family Foundation 2004), and even when errors
are disclosed, the conversation often fails to meet patients’ expectations
(Gallagher et al. 2003). The lack of open communication and an apology
after harmful events erodes trust, hinders patient care, and fuels litiga-
tion (Vincent, Young, and Phillips 1994). It also prevents providers and
institutions from assuming appropriate accountability and improving
patient safety (Sage 2003).
In conjunction with disclosure, health care organization leaders are
increasingly recognizing that a pervasive culture of individual blame
substantially limits their capacity to improve patient safety and clinical
outcomes. Accordingly, organizations are now turning to developing
a “just culture” that seeks the root causes of medical errors and pro-
motes a nonpunitive culture (Marx 2001). Rather than eliminating the
responsibility of the individual or organization when errors occur, this
approach examines both individual and systems-level factors, allows for
greater candor, and encourages individuals to participate in systems-level
harm prevention and remediation (Clarke, Lerner, and Marella 2007;
Connor et al. 2007; Khatri, Brown, and Hicks 2009; Khatri et al. 2007;
Marx 2001).
The Disclosure, Apology, and Offer (DA&O) model emphasizes both
honest communication with patients and families and a systems approach
to errors. It promotes a principled institutional response to unanticipated
clinical outcomes in which health care organizations (1) proactively iden-
tify adverse events, (2) distinguish between injuries caused by medical
negligence and those arising from complications of disease or intrinsi-
cally high-risk medical care, (3) offer patients full disclosure and honest
explanations, (4) encourage legal representation for patients and fami-
lies, and (5) offer an apology with rapid and fair compensation when
standards of care were not met (table 1). Patient safety interests are
better served when errors are captured and handled without protracted
litigation, allowing the institution and clinician to concentrate instead
on helping the patient and turning lessons learned into safety improve-
ments. Making whole those patients who have been harmed through
medical negligence as quickly and fairly as possible after a harmful
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TABLE 1
Characteristics of the Disclosure, Apology, and Offer Model
Actions Taken by Hospital and
Objective Liability Insurer
Increase transparency regarding adverse
outcomes and support physicians in
disclosing adverse outcomes to
patients.
• Disclose adverse outcomes of care
to patients and families.
• Investigate via root-cause analysis
and explain what happened.
• Provide an apology when
appropriate.
Improve patient safety. • Implement systems to avoid
recurrence of incidents, using
information from cases of medical
injury and near misses to identify
safety-enhancing interventions
and working with hospital staff to
implement them.
Avoid lawsuits, reduce liability costs,
and improve access to compensation
by meeting the financial needs of
injured patients and their families
quickly and fairly in the aftermath of
an injury.
• Offer financial compensation
when care was unreasonable,
without the patient having to file
a lawsuit.
• Defend cases vigorously when care
was reasonable.
error diminishes any conflicts of interest on the part of the physician or
the institution to help the patient while avoiding litigation and helps
preserve therapeutic relationships between patients and caregivers. The
model also enables institutions to focus on protecting future patients
from the same experience (Boothman et al. 2009; Kachalia, Kaufman,
and Boothman 2010; Kraman and Hamm 1999; Mello and Gallagher
2010).
To date, DA&O models have been implemented primarily by a small
number of self-insured (captive) hospital systems—the University of
Michigan the best-described program—and relatively little data exist
about the model’s likely effects in more diverse environments (Kachalia
and Mello 2011). The success of DA&O models in achieving the
dual goals of promoting patient safety improvements and reducing
malpractice costs, however, has garnered support from the Agency
for Health Care Quality and Research (AHRQ), the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, and other national
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organizations (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Or-
ganizations 2005). Nevertheless, relatively few hospital systems and
insurers have adopted this model.
The University of Michigan Health System began in late 2001 and
early 2002 what has since been called the disclosure, apology and offer
(DA&O) model for responding to patient injuries caused while render-
ing medical care. Initially using the opportunity offered by Michigan’s
compulsory preliminary notice of intent to sue (required before any
Michigan medical malpractice case can be filed) (Michigan Compiled
Laws §600.2912b [1994]), unanticipated clinical outcomes are now
identified quickly in an increasingly vigilant institutional culture via
various means, including voluntary electronic incident reports, patient
complaints, caregiver reports, and proactive data pulls of internally de-
rived patient safety indicators. While the process is tailored to each
individual case, patients and families are generally contacted by risk
management consultants, who ensure that new clinical care needs are
met, oversee the hospital’s investigation, review patients’ and providers’
expectations, and ensure full disclosure (Boothman et al. 2009). Patients
and families are kept informed, receive full disclosure, and also receive
an apology, with an offer of compensation when appropriate (Booth-
man et al. 2009, Boothman, Imhoff, and Campbell 2012). The program
is directly linked to the patient safety and peer review infrastructure
that dominates the overriding institutional focus. The Michigan pro-
gram’s claims experience was reported in a before-and-after examination,
which documented significant improvements in claims frequency, trans-
actional costs, incidence of litigation, and time-to-resolution (Kachalia,
Kaufman, and Boothman 2010). Moreover, these reports found that cul-
turally, the focus had shifted to safety, pushing medical malpractice into
the background (Boothman, Imhoff, and Campbell 2012).
In July 2010, the AHRQ awarded approximately $23 million in
grants for approaches to medical injury compensation that also improve
patient safety (AHRQ 2010a). Four of the demonstration projects fo-
cused on expanding the DA&O program in use at the University of
Michigan Health System (AHRQ 2010b), signaling national interest in
this model.
As part of a planning grant from this AHRQ program, we exam-
ined the prospects for more widespread implementation of the DA&O
model. Although some commentators have suggested factors that might
account for this model’s lack of widespread dissemination, particularly
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in settings other than self-insured academic medical centers, this issue
has not been empirically investigated previously (Localio 2010; Mello
and Gallagher 2010; Mello and Kachalia 2011; Peto et al. 2009). We
conducted a key informant interview study of stakeholders concerning
their perceptions of the DA&O model, perceived barriers to implemen-
tation, and strategies for overcoming them. While our study centered
on Massachusetts, we explored themes that are generalizable to other
states.
Methods
We conducted semistructured interviews with twenty-seven individu-
als in leadership positions in organizations or constituencies central to
implementing the DA&O approach in Massachusetts. We used a three-
stage selection process, in which the study team members first identified
major categories of stakeholder groups (e.g., liability insurers and pa-
tient advocacy groups), then identified leading organizations in the state
in each category, and, last, identified an individual in each organization
who either held a top leadership role or had expertise in legal and gov-
ernment affairs. We intended to capture a broad range of perspectives
and to interview that person in each organization who knew the most
about the potential barriers to adopting a DA&O model.
Three physician-investigators, working in teams of two (with the
exception of a single interview conducted by one interviewer), led the
interviews, which lasted forty-five to sixty minutes. The interviewers
used an interview guide that was pretested on two respondents not in-
cluded in the analytical sample. The interview guide covered four main
areas: (1) the respondent’s institutional setting and relevant experience,
(2) perceived potential for the DA&O model to improve medical liability
and patient safety, (3) perceived barriers to implementing DA&O pro-
grams, and (4) suggested strategies for overcoming identified barriers.
Each interview was digitally recorded and professionally transcribed. The
project was reviewed by the institutional review boards of the Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center and the Harvard School of Public Health.
We analyzed the transcripts using methods of thematic content anal-
ysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967). We developed a coding scheme of inter-
view topics after reading a random sample of transcripts, defining each
coding category in a detailed coding manual. One interviewer then
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TABLE 2
Interview Respondent Affiliations (n = 27)
Stakeholder Group Number of Respondents
State agencies and legislature 6
Hospital systems:





Medical professional associations 2
Patient advocacy organizations 2
Malpractice attorneys 2
Patient safety experts 2
Major physician practice groups 1
Business associations 1
coded each transcript, entering data into Microsoft Excel. Another in-
vestigator then compared the interview responses in each category to
find emerging themes. For some questions, response frequencies were
also tabulated. We then compiled and vetted the preliminary report,
first with the interview respondents for individual feedback, and second
at a meeting with a larger group of approximately 180 stakeholders,
structured to ensure that all viewpoints were solicited.
Results
The interview respondents represented a broad range of stakeholder
groups in Massachusetts (table 2). Of the twenty-eight stakeholder
groups in the original sampling frame, twenty-seven were interviewed
(96%). Two individuals from the original invitation list did not respond;
one was replaced with a stakeholder of similar background, and the other
did not have a specific replacement. The remaining invitees agreed to
be interviewed or provided a delegate. Overall, nine of the twenty-seven
(30%) respondents were physicians. Both major malpractice insurers in
the state were included, as were several smaller self-insured hospital
systems.
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TABLE 3
Appealing Aspects of the DA&O Model
Element Cited % (n)
Ethical and professional considerations 89 (24/27)
Reduces legal risk and costs 74 (20/27)
Improves safety culture in hospital 56 (15/27)
Improves dispute resolution process 37 (10/27)
Serves patients’ needs better 37 (10/27)
Pragmatic considerations (e.g., feasible, politically
salable, would make hospital look good)
11 (3/27)
Appeal of the DA&O Model
Asked what aspects, if any, of the DA&O model they found appealing,
the respondents most frequently cited ethical and professional consider-
ations (table 3), including open and compassionate responses to medical
injuries. As a hospital representative pointed out, “The appealing part
would be that it’s the right thing to do, that it removes all those le-
gal curtains, the discomfort and the barriers that make it hard to have
a conversation with someone and just say, ‘We’re sorry we hurt you.
We want to make it right for you.’” The potential for reduced legal
costs was another prospect that the respondents found appealing. Oth-
ers emphasized that the model was central to improving safety culture.
A state official remarked, “It encourages learning. It encourages pre-
venting the next problem so you’re not just covering something up.
You’re saying, ‘Let’s really look at what happened. Let’s get it out in
the open and let’s have a good conversation.’ Then the next time, it’s
less likely to happen.” Summing up these impressions, one respondent
called the model “a huge win for patients, [who] suffer as much as
anybody in the courts, maybe more. It’ll be a huge win for providers
emotionally. It will be a huge win from a financial perspective because
the right people will be getting compensated in a more timely manner
and there will be far less waste in the process.” Finally, pragmatic con-
siderations were mentioned as additional benefits, for example, that the
DA&O model would be feasible and even popular in an environment in
which political gridlock has precluded the legislative adoption of tort
reforms.
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Alternative Approaches
The majority of respondents felt that for improving the medical liability
and patient safety environments in Massachusetts, no alternative held
greater promise than the DA&O model. Those respondents who offered
alternatives primarily discussed complementary strategies like a manda-
tory prelitigation review period or, for cases not resolved by the DA&O
model, expert witness standards, caps on noneconomic damages, or the
use of health courts.
Barriers to Implementing the DA&O Model
and Strategies for Overcoming Them
Our interviews revealed several barriers to the widespread implementa-
tion of the DA&O model (table 4) and also strategies for surmounting
them. Here we summarize the most commonly cited barriers and solu-
tions. Later, in our discussion, we evaluate the relative significance of the
barriers in light of the feasibility of the suggested solutions. With the
exception of charitable immunity, all the barriers cited here are issues
that transcend the Massachusetts context.
Charitable Immunity. At the time of this study, Massachusetts law
limited to $20,000 the tort liability of any charitable corporation, trust,
or association (which includes nonprofit hospitals and health care in-
stitutions) (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 85K [2012]). This law
covers nearly all hospitals in Massachusetts. Our respondents mentioned
this law more often than any other barrier to implementing the DA&O
model, noting that hospitals’ limited financial responsibility for medical
injuries may undercut their interest in liability reform and incentives for
investment in patient safety. The stakeholders also worried that because
physicians are the “deep pockets” in the current system, they may be
reluctant to participate in disclosure.
The stakeholders agreed that fundamental changes to the charitable
immunity law, which applies to all Massachusetts nonprofit organiza-
tions, were unlikely but also unnecessary in order to advance the DA&O
model. A more practical approach, they suggested, is to encourage non-
profit institutions to compensate medical injuries at a fair value, regard-
less of any legal insulation from large awards at trial. Since the charitable
immunity law does not affect settlements, hospitals could (and often do)
choose to offer compensation above the cap, out of a sense of fairness,
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compassion, and/or regret over avoidable injuries. Many respondents saw
this as consonant with the shift toward accountable care organizations
(ACOs), which focus on organizational accountability above individual
responsibility for care outcomes. Essentially all the stakeholders agreed
that a voluntary assumption of responsibility for systems-based errors
reflected a more appropriate level of institutional accountability.
In August 2012 a provision increasing the charitable immunity cap
to $100,000 for medical liability was signed into law (ch. 224 of the
Acts of 2012). Since the cap is still very low, the stakeholders’ concerns
are still relevant, and the suggested voluntary accountability on the part
of institutions also remains salient.
Physicians’ Discomfort with Disclosure. The stakeholders noted that
most physicians are not adequately trained or supported in disclosure
processes, since such open communication about error is a radical de-
parture from prior practices (often based on legal advice) and prevailing
medical culture. They also raised concerns that incomplete legal protec-
tion for statements of apology in Massachusetts might impede full disclo-
sures, a concern that also applies to other states (Mastroianni et al. 2010).
Suggested strategies include robust “coaching” models, peer-
mentoring systems led by physicians experienced in error disclosure, and
involving patients and families in disclosure training. Respondents ad-
vocated clear disclosure protocols, support systems for clinicians, strong
institutional leadership, and the establishment of a “just culture” (Marx
2001). The respondents viewed disclosure as a critical skill for physi-
cians and advocated formal universal training (perhaps led by the Joint
Commission) starting early in medical education, and perhaps even
as a licensure requirement. Some advocated stronger legal protections
for statements of apology in order to prevent their use as inculpatory
evidence in malpractice suits, but others pointed out that the DA&O
program at the University of Michigan has succeeded despite the absence
of an apology law in that state until very recently.
Attorneys’ Interest in Maintaining the Status Quo. The stakeholders an-
ticipated resistance to the DA&O model from both plaintiff and defense
attorneys. Some felt that it was predominantly a financial issue, reflect-
ing an assumption that attorneys’ compensation would decrease under a
model that promoted early settlement. Others referred to plaintiff attor-
neys’ belief that the tort system protects patients’ interests by ensuring
that patients are always represented by attorneys and can have their
cases decided by a neutral adjudicator. Defense attorneys may share the
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view that the status quo best serves their clients’ interests, since it likely
results in settlement in fewer cases and does not involve the routine
disclosure of adverse outcomes. Yet the respondents felt that the level
of resistance in the legal community may not be as vociferous as might
be assumed and would be inadequate to block the model if health care
organizations and insurers chose to move ahead, since legislation was
not a prerequisite for the DA&O model.
The stakeholders suggested emphasizing that the DA&O model en-
dorses legal representation for patients, is more cost-effective for plaintiff
attorneys, and usually results in a higher proportion of harmed patients
receiving compensation efficiently. The model does not abridge any of
patients’ existing rights, as they can opt out and pursue litigation at any
time before accepting a settlement offer. In addition, the respondents
felt the DA&O model was more likely to meet patients’ needs by helping
“make the patient whole” without the “lottery” of the litigation process.
Pointing out that the current litigation model is extremely protracted,
some respondents thought that attorneys might see merit in a model
with a more efficient resolution.
Coordination across Insurers. Many respondents noted that DA&O
models have been used primarily in self-insured hospital systems and
that implementation would be more challenging if the facility and the
physicians were insured by different companies. One concern was about
“gaming” in multiple-defendant cases: if one insurer was committed
to openness and accepting responsibility but another was not, liability
might not be fairly apportioned. The respondents worried that such
lack of coordination could also draw out the process, defeating one of
the DA&O model’s goals, expediency. Also a key concern for insurers
was prompt access to all pertinent medical records so as to facilitate a
comprehensive, timely liability assessment.
The respondents felt that interinsurer coordination concerns could
be addressed collegially through a collaborative approach focused on
supporting patients. Others suggested involving the state commissioner
of insurance, and/or the Office of Patient Protection, either informally
or through a regulatory intervention.
Physicians’ Name–Based Reporting. Usually referring to the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), but also to the state Board of Registra-
tion in Medicine (BORM) or the Department of Public Health (DPH),
many respondents felt it unfair that physicians’ reputations could suffer
because of requirements to report malpractice claim settlements in the
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name of individual physicians, even when the errors were caused by a
failure of the system. Others pointed out that in order to avoid a “black
mark” on their record, physicians may resist settlement efforts. However,
as several respondents suggested, clinicians may not have a complete un-
derstanding of how often NPDB and BORM data are actually used and
to what end. They believed that decisions to withdraw a physician’s
credential to practice at a hospital or to initiate disciplinary proceed-
ings based on malpractice claims reports were more rare than physicians
think. The stakeholders suggested clarifying actual implications of re-
porting, and assuring physicians that cases meeting the standard of care
would not be compensated. Furthermore, the respondents noted that it
would be important to emphasize to physicians that unlike the current
system, proactive settlement would allow institutions to investigate the
event and assign responsibility to the institution for systems-based er-
rors, which generally encompass the large majority of adverse events.
Even in those cases in which settlements were made on the behalf of a
physician, they were likely to be at a lower value than through the court
system and were also likely to be settled early and in a more predictable
fashion than cases that proceeded to a lawsuit.
Recognizing, however, that the fear of name-based reporting under
current reporting requirements might be a major roadblock to gain-
ing physicians’ acceptance of and participation in DA&O programs, the
respondents widely endorsed a modification of NPDB and BORM re-
porting requirements to allow institution-based reporting for adverse
outcomes attributable to system failures.
Concern about Increased Liability. While the majority of stakeholders
believed that DA&O programs decreased liability risk, they feared that
many clinicians or insurers might not agree. The respondents thought
that physicians would be concerned about alerting patients to an injury
or error, making statements that might be used in litigation, piquing
plaintiff attorneys’ interest in cases in which error was specifically ac-
knowledged, and raising patients’ expectations about their chances of
recovering money in a claim.
The general consensus among stakeholders was that information was
key to allaying fears. Recommendations included education about the
effects of existing DA&O programs on the volume and cost of mal-
practice claims, and generating and disseminating new data by trying
out the model in additional settings like Massachusetts to help dispel
misconceptions. Strengthening the state’s apology law was also proposed
696 S.K. Bell et al.
as a useful strategy. At the time of the study, and until only recently,
Massachusetts’s apology law protected only those statements of regret
“expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence” relating to
accidental injuries, but not statements of explanation or responsibility
(Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 23D [2012]).
Forces of Inertia. The respondents recognized significant operational
and cultural shifts implicit in the DA&O model. Pointing out that
the legal, insurance, and medical communities all have some degree of
commitment to the current system, they cautioned that acceptance of
the change may be slow.
The stakeholders suggested strategies both to make the case that
such a change was worth making and to reduce organizations’ transi-
tion costs. They advocated a statewide resource (“centralized tool kit”)
to assist patients, clinicians, and organizational leadership with educa-
tional materials; data on the DA&O model, policies, procedures, and
algorithms; and expert references or contacts to assist with implementa-
tion, to share tools, and to minimize duplication. They highlighted the
importance of building an institutional infrastructure for DA&O mod-
els and utilizing opinion leaders and patient advocates to convey the
difference that the model could make for patients. They also suggested
that a broad-based coalition comprising the state hospital association,
medical society, BORM, DPH, health insurers, and patient advocacy
organizations could use their collective influence to overcome inertia.
Fairness to Patients. Many stakeholders feared that the public, plaintiff
attorneys, or others might perceive the DA&O model as “anticonsumer”
and become suspicious of the motives of institutions that adopted it.
Their primary concern was that the public would view the DA&O
model as an attempt to persuade patients to settle cases of serious injury
quickly, for small amounts of money, and without the benefit of counsel.
The respondents stressed the need to educate the public and media
about the DA&O approach, in order to decrease skepticism. The first
priority, they said, was to emphasize that the model’s primary goal was to
support patients and provide safer care, and that reducing costs was a sec-
ondary benefit. Underscoring individual as well as system accountability
and stressing that “bad apples” would not escape disciplinary sanctions
might also ease the public’s concerns. Ensuring that patients had access
to attorneys in the DA&O process and developing a standardized and
transparent “formula” for compensation might help win the public’s
trust. Involving patients and/or their families in the investigation was
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also proposed as a way to strengthen partnership and credibility. The in-
terviewees also recommended both demonstrating the gains for patient
safety derived from the model and ensuring a mechanism for sharing
“lessons learned” in cases that could readily apply to other health care
organizations.
At the same time, the respondents stressed that legal protection of
the peer-review process would be needed to help clinicians safely engage
in the DA&O process and that comprehensive event root-cause analyses
should be isolated from claims management and liability assessment.
Some stakeholders also suggested that external regulation might be
needed to ensure accountability. For example, the state DPH, patient
safety organizations, or ACOs could set standards for the DA&O process,
monitor institutions’ DA&O activities, and disseminate information
about outcomes.
May Not Work in Other Settings. Some stakeholders noted that com-
pared with large academic centers, small hospitals may face greater
resource constraints, such as risk-management staff and the institution’s
ability to gamble on an approach that might increase liability costs.
In addition, they felt that hospitals whose physicians were only loosely
affiliated with the facility, rather than directly employed by it, might
have fewer levers with which to influence those physicians to change
their reporting and disclosure practices. The stakeholders were also con-
cerned that small institutions (and physicians’ practice groups) may
face substantial barriers in organizing robust and timely investigation
processes. Since private practitioners often volunteer their time at local
hospitals for peer review, additional time demands could prove unreal-
istic. Similarly, using the DA&O model in an ambulatory setting or in
community health centers may require special resources and approaches
tailored to those settings. Finally, some suggested that the culture in
rural areas might be less amenable to full transparency than would
that of the urban/suburban areas where DA&O programs currently
operate.
To overcome this barrier, the respondents favored a centralized re-
source center, standardized policies for inpatient and ambulatory set-
tings, and universal training and education for physicians and clinical
leaders, as well as an oversight mechanism to ensure adherence to these
guidelines. They also recommended financial support for physicians tak-
ing on additional quality improvement responsibilities, particularly if
their contributions were voluntary.
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Discussion
DA&O programs have the potential to improve both medical liability
and patient safety (Boothman et al. 2009; Kachalia, Kaufman, and
Boothman 2010; McDonald et al. 2010). The approach continues to
attract attention, including the interest and financial support of the
federal government. Yet despite broad dissemination of positive results
from exemplary DA&O programs (Boothman et al. 2009; Kachalia,
Kaufman, and Boothman 2010; Mello and Gallagher 2010), the model
has not been broadly adopted by health care institutions or even self-
insured hospitals. This study examined why.
We confirmed some of the potential barriers identified in previous
commentary (Kachalia and Mello 2011; Localio 2010; Mello and Gal-
lagher 2010; Peto et al. 2009), uncovered new ones, and measured the
frequency with which diverse stakeholders perceive them as problems.
The study also highlighted potential solutions that stakeholders view
as feasible and important to pursue. Our findings can help physician-
leaders, educators, patient advocates, and policymakers identify and
prioritize next steps to prepare environments other than closed (captive)
systems for a DA&O model.
The barriers we found fell into four broad categories: (1) cultural
barriers such as physicians’ discomfort with disclosure and apology and
anxiety about potentially greater liability exposure, attorneys’ tendency
to cling to the adversarial legal system, and general resistance to change;
(2) legal barriers like charitable immunity and physicians’ fears of name-
based reporting of malpractice settlements; (3) logistical obstacles like
the complexities of interinsurer coordination and practical challenges in
small hospitals and noncaptive practice settings; and (4) political barriers,
such as the challenges of securing strong apology laws and other enabling
legislation and of assuring the public that the DA&O approach is fair to
patients and adequately holds health care providers accountable.
Examining the frequency with which various barriers were cited by
diverse stakeholders is important to understanding the overall environ-
ment for a broad rollout of the DA&O approach. To understand the
most important barriers to DA&O adoption, however, we must consider
both this frequency and the difficulty of overcoming the barrier. Some
of the most frequently mentioned barriers can be surmounted relatively
easily. For example, interinsurer coordination is eminently achievable
given that many states have only a small number of insurers serving the
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market and that their interests are aligned in terms of avoiding litigation
and improving patient safety. Attorneys’ opposition was a commonly
cited barrier, but defense attorneys act at the direction of their clients,
and plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely to quickly grasp the benefits of early
settlement processes, as they have in the existing DA&O programs.
Conversely, some of the less tractable barriers were mentioned relatively
infrequently by our respondents. Most notably, the role of institutional
leadership was not commonly cited but is likely to prove critical, as
successful DA&O programs have, to a large extent, grown out of the
dedicated efforts of an institutional champion, and true culture change
requires commitment from the top. Charitable immunity still stands
out as a barrier that is both widely recognized and difficult to remove,
even with the recently raised cap. But it is a problem unique to Mas-
sachusetts, and stakeholders agreed that while it may dampen interest
in the DA&O model, no law change is required to move forward with
the model.
While none of the obstacles was viewed as insurmountable, the general
consensus of our respondents was that overcoming these obstacles would
require coordinated, focused action and a larger evidence base to convince
wary stakeholders. The challenge of catalyzing this concerted action
across diverse stakeholders without incontrovertible evidence that the
model would be successful in new settings may explain why there has
not been greater use of the model, despite the intense interest of both
health systems and insurers in the University of Michigan’s success story.
The stakeholders’ overall attitude was enthusiastic and cautiously op-
timistic. While the DA&O model was nearly universally recognized
as a promising way forward, some respondents also were skeptical
whether other stakeholders would be willing to break the status quo
and support a new approach. In particular, some respondents worried
that plaintiff and defense attorneys as well as professional liability in-
surers may be reluctant to proceed with the DA&O program, since they
felt that these parties may benefit financially from the current system.
Since we completed these interviews, however, the Massachusetts Med-
ical Society, the Massachusetts Bar Association, and the Massachusetts
Academy of Trial Attorneys developed consensus language to establish
(1) a mandatory six-month prelitigation notification period, including
sharing of all pertinent medical records (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
231§ 60L [2012]) and (2) stronger apology protections, including state-
ments of explanation, responsibility, or regret (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 233§ 79L [2012]). These items were signed into law as part of a
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comprehensive payment reform bill in August 2012 (ch. 224 of the
Acts of 2012). In addition, several hospitals and their professional lia-
bility insurers in Massachusetts are participating in a multi-institution
pilot for implementing the DA&O model (Massachusetts Medical
Society 2012).
Next Steps: What Organizations and the States
Can Do
Most of the strategies that the stakeholders proposed are actionable items
that health care systems and state organizations can pursue on their
own. The first step is to develop a broad-based educational campaign
regarding the DA&O approach, along with disclosure training pro-
grams and DA&O policies and procedures. Development of a statewide,
web-based repository of tool kits, guidelines, best practices, outcomes
data, and other resources could be of significant benefit to organiza-
tions, especially small and underresourced hospitals, in building the
case for the DA&O model and rolling out programs. Professional associ-
ations and other stakeholder organizations, hospitals that have success-
fully launched DA&O programs, the leaders and sites of the ongoing
AHRQ demonstration projects, and state regulators all could be valuable
contributors.
Health care organizations also need robust event analysis and loop-
closure processes applicable to a variety of clinical settings. Statewide
guidelines for the event root-cause analysis, for example, currently under
development by the Massachusetts BORM, could help standardize the
process. Similarly, discussions between the Massachusetts Medical Soci-
ety and the Massachusetts BORM are under way to make recommended
modifications to name-based reporting requirements and develop con-
sensus language to pave the way to reforms that prevent systems-related
errors disclosed as part of a DA&O program from being attributed to an
individual physician. The enabling liability reform provisions recently
passed in Massachusetts or similar supportive legislation in other states,
while not necessary to institute DA&O, might encourage organizations
to adopt the model. Specifically, a strong apology law that protected
statements of explanation, responsibility, or regret, as well as a manda-
tory six-month prelitigation review period, may facilitate acceptance of
the DA&O model by health care providers and insurers. Considerable
work is already being done as part of the AHRQ demonstration projects
to tackle issues like interinsurer coordination, support of small hospitals
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and community practices, and the inclusion of patients and families in
the event analysis (AHRQ 2010a, 2010b; Kachalia and Mello 2011).
Lessons learned from these efforts can also help guide organizational
leaders. Finally, progress may rely on creating a forum to convene stake-
holders and establish a coalition of like-minded leaders committed to
the DA&O model.
Our study was limited by the relatively small size of our sample
of respondents. While we included stakeholders from a broad array
of backgrounds, capturing a wide range of viewpoints, it is possible
that the respondents—although typically leaders of their respective
organizations—did not adequately represent the full spectrum of views
of their stakeholder group. Some of the respondents also might have
been more familiar with the DA&O approach than their members. Fur-
thermore, since the interviewees were asked to think about barriers in
largely hypothetical terms (i.e., without experiencing the DA&O process
firsthand), the respondents could have misperceived, or missed, various
barriers.
Another limitation relates to the unique circumstance of Mas-
sachusetts’s charitable immunity law. Massachusetts may be a more
challenging environment for implementing the DA&O approach than
other states. Although the other barriers identified by our respondents
are generalizable outside Massachusetts, the respondents’ views of the
feasibility of the DA&O model may reflect their view from the shadow
of the charitable immunity law. Given the general enthusiasm for the
program despite this limitation in Massachusetts, its actual feasibility
in or beyond Massachusetts may be even higher.
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the challenges to wide-scale implementation, there
was a striking degree of consensus among the stakeholders that the
DA&O model holds great potential to improve medical liability and
patient safety. It was viewed as more promising than any other liability
reform option, both on its merits and because it would not be stymied by
political gridlock in state legislatures, as other tort reforms frequently
have been. The potential role for DA&O programs in the broader con-
text of federal health reform efforts is intriguing. The model offers
an avenue for bringing diverse stakeholders together because—unlike
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traditional liability reforms such as damages caps—it offers a plausible
“value proposition” to patients. DA&O programs may prove not only
to constrain liability costs but also to improve access to compensation,
strengthen linkages between the liability system and patient safety, in-
crease health care organizations’ accountability and patient advocacy,
and promote transparency in regard to medical error.
References
AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality). 2010a. Medical
Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration and Planning Grants.
Rockville, MD. Available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability (ac-
cessed January 6, 2011).
AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality). 2010b. Med-
ical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration Grants.
Rockville, MD. Available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/
demogrants.htm (accessed January 6, 2011).
American Hospital Association, Management Advisory Committee.
1992. Ethical Conduct for Health Care Institutions. Chicago.
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management of the American
Hospital Association. 2003. Disclosure of Unanticipated Events: The
Next Step in Better Communication with Patients. Chicago: American
Hospital Association.
Banja, J. 2001. Moral Courage in Medicine—Disclosing Medical Error.
Bioethics Forum 17(2):7–11.
Blendon, R.J., C.M. DesRoches, and M. Brodie. 2002. Views of Prac-
ticing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors. New England
Journal of Medicine 347(24):1933–40.
Boothman, R.C., A.C. Blackwell, D.A. Campbell Jr., E. Commiskey,
and S. Anderson. 2009. A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims? The University of Michigan Experience. Journal of Health
& Life Sciences Law 2(2):125–59.
Boothman, R.C., S.H. Imhoff, and D.A. Campbell. 2012. Nurturing
a Culture of Patient Safety and Achieving Lower Malpractice Risk
through Disclosure: Lessons Learned and Future Directions. Frontiers
of Health Services Management 28(3):13–28.
Brennan, T.A., M.M. Mello, and D.M. Studdert. 2006. Liability, Patient
Safety, and Defensive Medicine: What Does the Future Hold? In
Medical Malpractice and the U.S. Health Care System: New Century,
Different Issues, ed. W.M. Sage and R. Kersh, 93–114. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Disclosure, Apology, and Offer Programs 703
Cantor, M.D., P. Barach, A. Derse, C.W. Maklan, G.S. Wlody, and E.
Fox. 2005. Disclosing Adverse Events to Patients. Journal on Quality
and Patient Safety 31(1):5–12.
Clarke, J.R., J.C. Lerner, and W. Marella. 2007. The Role for Leaders
of Health Care Organizations in Patient Safety. American Journal of
Medical Quality 22:311–18.
Connor, M., D. Duncombe, E. Barclay, S. Bartel, C. Borden, E. Gross,
C. Miller, and P. Reid Ponte. 2007. Creating a Fair and Just
Culture: One Institution’s Path toward Organizational Change. Joint
Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 33(10):617–24.
Delbanco, T., and S.K. Bell. 2007. Guilty, Afraid, and Alone—
Struggling with Medical Error. New England Journal of Medicine
357(17):1682–83.
Gallagher, T.H., A.D. Waterman, A.G. Ebers, V.J. Fraser, and W.
Levinson. 2003. Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the
Disclosure of Medical Errors. JAMA 289(8):1001–7.
Glaser, B., and A. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strate-
gies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine.
Hiatt, H.H., B.A. Barnes, T.A. Brennan, N.M. Laird, A.G. Lawthers,
L.L. Leape, A.R. Localio, J.P. Newhouse, L.M. Peterson, K.E.
Thorpe, P.C. Weiler, and W.G. Johnson. 1989. A Study of Medical
Injury and Medical Malpractice. New England Journal of Medicine
321:480–84.
Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care in America.
2001. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st
Century. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. 2005.
Health Care at the Crossroads: Strategies for Improving the Medical Lia-
bility System and Preventing Patient Injury. Washington, DC.
Kachalia, A., S.R. Kaufman, and R. Boothman. 2010. Liability Claims
and Costs Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error
Disclosure Program. Annals of Internal Medicine 153:213–21.
Kachalia, A., and M.M. Mello. 2011. New Directions in Medical Lia-
bility Reform. New England Journal of Medicine 364(16):1564–72.
Kaiser Family Foundation, Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, and Harvard School of Public Health. 2004. Na-
tional Survey on Consumers’ Experiences with Patient Safety and
Quality Information. Available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/
pomr111704pkg.cfm (accessed August 15, 2012).
Kessler, D., and M. McClellan. 1996. Do Doctors Practice Defensive
Medicine? Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:353–90.
Khatri, N., G.D. Brown, and L. Hicks. 2009. From a Blame Culture
to a Just Culture in Health Care. Health Care Management Review
34(4):312–22.
704 S.K. Bell et al.
Khatri, N., J. Halbesleben, G.F. Petroski, and W. Meyer. 2007. Rela-
tionship between Management Philosophy and Clinical Outcomes.
Health Care Management Review 2(32):128–39.
Kraman, S.S., and G. Hamm. 1999. Risk Management: Extreme Hon-
esty May Be the Best Policy. Annals of Internal Medicine 131:
963–67.
Localio, A.R. 2010. Patient Compensation without Litigation: A
Promising Development. Annals of Internal Medicine 153:266–67.
Localio, A.R., A.G. Lawthers, T.A. Brennan, N.M. Laird, L.E. Herbert,
L.M. Peterson, J.P. Newhouse, P.C. Weiler, and H.H. Hiatt. 1991.
Relation between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III. New
England Journal of Medicine 325:245–51.
Marx, D. 2001. Patient Safety and the “Just Culture”: A Primer for Health
Care Executives. New York: Columbia University Press.
Massachusetts Medical Society. 2008. Investigation of Defensive
Medicine in Massachusetts. Waltham, MA. Available at www.
massmed.org/defensivemedicine (accessed August 15, 2012).
Massachusetts Medical Society. 2012. Physicians, Hospitals, Health
Groups Announce Initiative to Improve the Medical Liability Env-




Mastroianni, A., M.M. Mello, S. Sommer, M. Hardy, and T.H. Gal-
lagher. 2010. The Flaws in State “Apology” and “Disclosure” Laws
Dilute Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits. Health Affairs
(Millwood) 29(9):1611–19.
McDonald, T.B., L.A. Helmchen, K.M. Smith, N. Centomani, A. Gun-
derson, D. Mayer, and W.H. Chamberlin. 2010. Responding to
Patient Safety Incidents: The “Seven Pillars.” Quality & Safety in
Health Care 19(6):e11 (epub. March 1, 2010).
Mello, M.M., and T.H. Gallagher. 2010. Malpractice Reform—
Opportunities for Leadership by Health Care Institutions and Lia-
bility Insurers. New England Journal of Medicine 362(15):1353–56.
Mello, M.M., and A. Kachalia. 2011. New Directions in Medical Lia-
bility Reform. New England Journal of Medicine 364(16):1564–72.
Mello, M.M, and D.M. Studdert. 2008. Deconstructing Negligence: The
Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries.
Georgetown Law Journal 96:599–623.
Mello, M.M., D.M. Studdert, C.M. DesRoches, J. Peugh, K. Zapert,
T.A. Brennan, and W.M. Sage. 2005. Effects of the Malpractice
Crisis on Specialist Supply and Access to Care. Annals of Surgery
242:621–28.
Disclosure, Apology, and Offer Programs 705
O’Leary, K.J., J. Choi, K. Watson, and M.V. Williams. 2012. Medical
Students’ and Residents’ Clinical and Educational Experiences with
Defensive Medicine. Academic Medicine 87(2):142–48.
Peto, R.R., L.M. Tenerowicz, E.M. Benjamin, D.S. Morsi, and P.K.
Burger. 2009. One System’s Journey in Creating a Disclosure and
Apology Program. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient
Safety 35(10):487–96.
Reason, J. 2000. Human Error: Models and Management. BMJ
320(7237):768–70.
Sage, W.M. 2003. Medical Liability and Patient Safety. Health Affairs
(Millwood) 22(4):26–36.
Studdert, D.M., M.M. Mello, and T.A. Brennan. 2004. Medical Mal-
practice. New England Journal of Medicine 350(3):283–92.
Studdert, D.M, M.M. Mello, A.A. Gawande, T.K. Ghandi, A. Kachalia,
C. Yoon, A.L. Puopolo, and T.A. Brennan. 2006. Claims, Errors,
and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation.
New England Journal of Medicine 354:2024–33.
Studdert, D.M., M.M. Mello, W.M. Sage, C.M. DesRoches, J. Peugh, K.
Zapert, and T.A. Brennan. 2005. Defensive Medicine among High-
Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment.
JAMA 293(21):2609–17.
Vincent, C., M. Young, and A. Phillips. 1994. Why Do People Sue
Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action.
The Lancet 343(8913):1609–13.
Waterman, A.D., J. Garbutt, and E. Hazel. 2007. The Emotional Impact
of Medical Errors on Practicing Physicians in the United States
and Canada. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety
33(8):467–76.
West, C.P., M.M. Huschka, P.J. Novotny, J.A. Sloan, J.C. Kolars, T.M.
Habermann, and T.D. Shanafelt. 2006. Association of Perceived
Medical Errors with Resident Distress and Empathy: A Prospective
Longitudinal Study. JAMA 296:1071–78.
Wu, A.W., T.A. Cavanaugh, S.J. McPhee, B. Lo, and G.P. Micco. 1997.
To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical
Mistakes to Patients. Journal of General Internal Medicine 12(12):
770–75.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable con-
tributions of Elaine Kirshenbaum and Charles Alagero. SKB thanks the Gold
Foundation for career development support through an Arnold P. Gold Profes-
sorship. The authors received funding from the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (1R21 HS019537).
